G.R. No. L-56694 Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay, et. al. July 2, 1990

Facts:

On September 30, 1978, Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother Petra Pinote, filed in the CFI of Cebu, Branch XVI, at Lapu-Lapu City, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original certificate of title to Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, which, as shown by a certified copy of the Municipal Index of Decrees, was supposedly adjudicated to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, under Decree No. 230607 dated May 7, 1934 in Cadastral Case No. 20, LRC Rec. No. 1004.

By an order dated November 6, 1978, the court set the case for hearing on February 22, 1979 at 8:30 A.M. A copy of the notice of hearing was ordered to be published in the Official Gazette, furnished to all the adjoining owners, and posted by the Sheriff at the main entrances of the Provincial Capitol Building, the City Hall, and the Public Market of Lapu-Lapu City, at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing. The court also ordered copies of the notice and order to be sent to the Registers of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City and Cebu, the Director of Lands, and the Commissioner of Land Registration, directing them to show cause, if any, why the petition may not be granted.

It does not appear, however, that notices were sent to each of the registered co-owners — Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, or their heirs, so that they could have been heard on the petition.

As there was no opposition to the petition when it was called for hearing, the lower court commissioned its Clerk of Court to receive the evidence.

Based on the Commissioner’s Report, as well as the oral and documentary evidence submitted by Francisco Otto in support of his petition, the Court issued an order on June 7, 1979, directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to reconstitute the original certificate of title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, upon payment of the corresponding fees, in the names of Saturnino Pinote, married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra (not Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote. The court relied on the supposed abstract of the decision of the cadastral court, the technical descriptions, plan and report of the Land Registration Commission which are not found in the records before us.

Pursuant to the court’s order, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2355 of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City was issued in the names of the alleged brothers and sisters, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra (not Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.

On October 1, 1979, Atty. Porfirio Ellescas, as alleged counsel for the heirs of Pedro, Juana and Saturnino Pinote, supposedly all deceased, filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order, and sought the re-opening of the proceedings and the rectification of the June 7, 1979 order, for, while Otto’s main petition for reconstitution based on the Municipal Index of Decrees, alleged that Lot 2381 was decreed in the names of Irineo, Juana, Saturnino,Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the court’s order of June 7, 1979 ordered the reconstitution of the title in the names of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra (instead of Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote. The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that they “learned of the error” only on September 27, 1979 through their counsel, who made the inquiry and obtained a copy of the court order.

A copy of the motion for reconsideration was received by Attorney Ramon Codilla, Otto’s counsel, on Oct. 5, 1979. The hearing of the motion was set on Nov. 14, 1979 at 8:30 A.M. with notice to Otto and Atty. Cedilla. Because of a conflict in his trial calendar, Atty. Ellescas informed the court that he would not be able to attend the hearing. Only Atty. Codilla appeared at the hearing on Nov. 14, 1979. He was ordered by the court to submit a photocopy of OCT No. RO-2355 which he complied with.

On December 2, 1979, the court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration.

On January 2, 1980, the heirs of the late Pedro Pinote filed their notice of appeal. On January 4, 1980, they filed an urgent ex parte motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. The record on appeal was filed on January 9, 1980, and a copy was sent to the private respondent by registered mail on the same date.

On May 10, 1980, the court denied due course to the appeal on the ground of tardiness as the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, which the court declared to be pro forma, did not suspend the finality of the court’s June 7, 1979 order.

Hence, the petition for mandamus and/or certiorari.

Issues:

  1. Whether the petitioners’ appeal is timely; and
  2. Whether the reconstitution proceedings should be reopened and the order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979 should be rectified or amended.

Ruling:

1. Yes.

Firstly, their motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 7, 1979 was not pro forma. It invited the court’s attention to a substantial variance between the petition for reconstitution and the court’s order of reconstitution. The error adverted to in the motion for reconsideration is substantial for it affects the participation and interest of Pedro Pinote (or his heirs) in Lot No. 2381, an interest that appeared in the petition for reconstitution and in the notice of hearing issued by the court, but which disappeared from the court’s order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979, having been replaced by “Petra Pinote” instead.

Secondly, the motion for reconsideration was timely filed. The petitioners had not been separately notified of the reconstitution proceedings except by constructive notice through the published notice of hearing. They discovered the assailed order dated June 7, 1979 on September 27, 1979, through Atty. Ellescas. They had up to October 27, 1979 to either file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. They filed a motion for reconsideration on October 1, 1979 after only four (4) days of the 30-day appeal period had elapsed, so, they had 26 days left to appeal. On December 11, 1979, they received the court’s order denying their motion for reconsideration. They filed a notice of appeal, cash appeal bond and a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal on January 4, 1980 or 24 days later, with two (2) or more days of the appeal period to spare. Their record on appeal was actually filed on January 8, 1980, within the 10-day extension which they sought from the court. Clearly, their appeal was seasonably filed.

2. Yes, the previous orders having been issued without jurisdiction.

As the petition for reconstitution of title was a proceeding in rem, compliance with the requirements of R.A. 26 is a condition sine qua non for the conferment of jurisdiction on the court taking cognizance of the petition. Considering that both the petition and the court’s notice of hearing, referred to the reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 in the names of the registered co-owners, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the cadastral court had jurisdiction only to grant or deny the prayer of the petition as published in the notice of hearing. The court could not receive evidence proving that Petra Pinote, instead of Pedro, is a registered co-owner of Lot 2381. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. Hence, in Bunagan, et al.vs. CFI of Cebu, et al., where the certificate of title was decreed in the names of “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,” the reconstitution of the title in the names of “spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong” was held to be “a material change that cannot be authorized.”

The jurisdiction of the cadastral court is hedged in by the four walls of the petition and the published notice of hearing which define the subject matter of the petition. If the court oversteps those borders, it acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction in the case.

On the basis of the allegations of the petition and the published notice of hearing, the heirs of Pedro Pinote had no reason to oppose the petition for reconstitution for the rights and interest in Lot 2381 of their ancestor, Pedro Pinote, were not adversely affected by the petition. It was only when Pedro’s name (and in effect, his interest in Lot 2381) disappeared from the court’s order of reconstitution that his heirs had cause to rise in arms as it were, and ask for the reopening of the case.

G.R. No. 112019 Santos v. CA January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel Santos is a member of the Army who met Julia in Ilioilo City. On September 20, 1986, the two exchange vows before the RTC of Iloilo, which was shortly followed by a church wedding.

Sometime in 1988, Julia decided to leave for US to work as a nurse, despite the pleas to dissuade her otherwise. Seven months have passed since her leaving for US before Julia made her first call to Santos promising that she will return home after the expiration of her contract. However, Julia did not make good of her promise despite  Santos even going over to US in one of his trips under the auspices of the Philippine Army to persuade Julia to come back to the Philippines.

Julia’s persistent refusal to return home and her alleged failure to communicate with Santos for a period of five years have prompted the latter to file an annulment case stating as a ground the psychological incapacity of Julia under Article 36 of the Family Code. According to Santos, a wife who does not care to inform her husband of her whereabouts for five years and does not communicate with him is psychologically incapacitated.

Issue:

Whether or not Julia was psychologically incapacitated to warrant the annulment of her marriage with Santos under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

No. In the words of the Supreme Court, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Accordingly, the factual setting of the case at bench had in no way measure at all, to the standards required to decree the marriage as null and void. While the court recognizes that Santos is undeniably aggrieved, even desperate in his current condition, regrettably, however, neither law nor society itself can have all the answers to every individual problem.

The Supreme Court in this case notably lacked adequate discussion as to why the actuations of Julia did not amount to psychological incapacity. What was strengthened in the discussion was the meaning and import of the psychological incapacity.

G.R. No. 167459 Ochosa v. Alano and Republic January 26, 2011

Facts:

Jose is a military man who got married to Bona. Due to the former’s work requirements, he was often assigned to different areas in Mindanao. Bona chose to stay in her place instead of following her husband in his detail assignments in other areas in Mindanao.

Sometime during their marriage, Jose got promoted and was given a quarter for him and his family at Fort Santiago in 1985.

During this period, it appeared that Bona was unfaithful to her spouse as she later on admitted having sexual relations with Jose’s driver whenever the latter was out on duty.

This prompted Jose to file an annulment case on the ground of Bona’s psychological incapacity to perform the basic obligations of marriage. The trial court granted the annulment but was later on overturned by the CA upon appeal on the ground that evidentiary facts do not establish Bona’s psychological incapacity. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Bona was psychologically incapacitated to warrant the dissolution of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

No. The case of Bona having sexual infidelity alone was not enough to show that she was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the petition for annulment by Jose.

While the Court agrees that Bona’s act of sexual infidelity shows the gravity of her incapacity to carry out the essential duties required of marriage, such incapacity was not proven to have juridical antecedence and was not shown to be incurable.

The Court in this case stressed that the incapacity must be proven to have existed at the inception of marriage even though its manifestation was seen after the celebration of marriage. In this case, the psychiatrists who gave her testimony regarding Bona’s psychological condition relied heavily only on the uncorroborated testimony of Jose’s witness. However, the court did not say that a personal examination of witness is necessary in this case. Accordingly, testimonies of those who knew Bona would have strengthened the allegations of Bona’s psychological incapacity.

Finally, the court in this case once again pronounced that a case of annulment by reason of psychological incapacity should be examined by the trial court in light of the unique facts of the case and not rely on pre-adjudged notions or conditions.

G.R. No. L-29073 Bunagan, et. al. v. Branch VI, CFI of Cebu, et. al. April 18, 1980

Facts:

Dionisia Icong and her children named Filemon, Manuel, Arsenio, and Napoleon, all surnamed Ompad, filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition for the reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name of “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, spouses,” and once reconstituted, to cancel the same and another one issued in the name of “Filemon Ompad; Manuel Ompad; Arsenio Ompad…; Napoleon Ompad…; and Dionisia Icong, surviving spouse of Antonio Ompad.

The petition was opposed by Espiritu Bunagan, upon the ground that he is the owner of the lot in question; and that Dionisia Icong is merely a trustee of the lot in behalf of Antonio Ompad.

Later, petitioners Icong and children moved to dismiss the opposition.

The cadastral court then ruled that it could not entertain the claim of the oppositor which should be ventilated in an ordinary civil action, and gave due course to the petition. After hearing, the court issued an order, dated June 17, 1967, ordering the reconstitution of the original certificate of title of Lot No. 1660…in the names of the original owners  spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong…

Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 was issued in the name of “spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong.”

Espiritu Bunagan then filed an urgent motion to correct the order of June 17, 1967 and the original certificate of title No. RO-9675, by substituting, as the registered owners of Lot 1660 “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Incong” instead of “spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong” upon the ground that upon the evidence presented, the lot was adjudicated to “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong” during the cadastral proceedings, and not to spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong.

Dionisia Icong filed her opposition thereto claiming that the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of “spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong” is warranted under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act which authorizes alteration or amendment of the title upon proper petition.

Sometime thereafter, the respondent Court issued an order, denying the motion to correct the order of June 17, 1967.

Hence, this instant recourse to annul and set aside the said orders.

Issue:

Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the reconstituted title in the name of “Spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong” instead of “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong” as reflected in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Ruling:

Yes.

Firstly, the reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occured. If the certificate of title covering the lot was decreed in the form of “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,” as in this case, the reconstituted certificate of title should likewise be in the name of the owners as they appeared in the lost or destroyed certificate of title sought to be reconstituted. Any change that should be made in the ownership of the property should be the subject of a separate suit.

Secondly, the claim of Dionisia Icong that the change is authorized under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act is without merit. The proceedings authorized in Section 112 could not be availed of in view of the opposition of the herein petitioners, for such proceedings apply only if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.

R.A. No. 9165 – The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; Violations

Section 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals

Section 6. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort

Section 7. Employees and Visitors of a Den, Dive or Resort

Section 8. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals

Section 9. Illegal Chemical Diversion of Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals

Section 10. Manufacture or Delivery of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus, and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs

Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs

Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings

Section 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs

Section 16. Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous Drugs or are Sources Thereof

Section 17. Maintenance and Keeping of Original Records of Transactions on Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals

Section 18. Unnecessary Prescription of Dangerous Drugs

Section 19. Unlawful Prescription of Dangerous Drugs

Failure to indicate in one’s pleadings the number and date of issue of his/her MCLE Certificate of Compliance; Effect

Question:

An information was filed charging A of illegal use of dangerous drugs. The information, however, failed to indicate the MCLE Compliance No. of B, the prosecutor who signed it. Mindful of such ommission, A filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information. B, on the other hand, filed its comment/opposition to the motion, alleging, among others, that lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and signed the Information should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against persons who have violated the law. If you were the judge, would you grant or deny said motion? Explain.

Answer:

If I were the judge, I would deny the motion. Under the SC En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended Bar Matter No. 1922 by repealing the phrase “Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records” and replacing it with “Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action”, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.  – People v. Arrojado

G.R. No. 187122 Negros Slashers, Inc., et al. v. Teng February 22, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Alvin Teng is a professional basketball player who started his career as such in the Philippine Basketball Association and then later on played in the Metropolitan Basketball Association (MBA).

Some time in one of his games, particularly Game Number 4 of the MBA Championship Round for the year 2000 season, Teng had a below-par playing performance.  Because of this, the coaching staff decided to pull him out of the game.  Teng then sat on the bench, untied his shoelaces and donned his practice jersey.  On the following game, Game Number 5 of the Championship Round, Teng called-in sick and did not play.

On March 16, 2001, because of what happened, the management of Negros Slashers came up with a decision, and through its General Manager, petitioner Rodolfo Alvarez, wrote Teng informing him of his termination from the team.

Issue:

Whether or not Teng’s dismissal from the Negros Slashers Team was unjustified and too harsh considering his misconduct.

Ruling:

Yes. As ruled in Sagales v. Rustan’s Commercial Corporation, while the employer has the inherent right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees, this prerogative is subject to the regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.

In this regard, it is a hornbook doctrine that infractions committed by an employee should merit only the corresponding penalty demanded by the circumstance. The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee and must be imposed in connection with the disciplinary authority of the employer.

In the case at bar, the penalty handed out by the petitioners was the ultimate penalty of dismissal.  There was no warning or admonition for respondent’s violation of team rules, only outright termination of his services for an act which could have been punished appropriately with a severe reprimand or suspension.